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Why American Voters Decide to Vote for Third Parties in Presidential Elections

A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at
Syracuse University

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May 2013

Honors Capstone Project in Political Science

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Abstract

Not a single person representing a third party has ever been elected president. Yet, year after year, there are candidates and voters who support individuals who have no chance of winning. Being able to understand why people decide to vote for third party candidates helps us to be better able to predict presidential race outcomes and could also lead to more successful third party candidates.

I find that third party voters in presidential elections tend to be more independent voters who have not committed to one political party. Younger voters are often supporters of third parties. Because they have not voted in as many elections as older voters, there is less of a pattern of votes for one particular party. Third party voters also tend to dislike government, in general. They are more likely to feel disenfranchised by the political process. The two main parties, they feel, do not accurately represent their views. They vote for third parties partly because they genuinely like the candidate and his views, and partly to cast a vote against the two main parties. These reasons for voting for third parties describe many, but not all, third party voters. These patterns are evident in both a long-term study of American presidential elections and short-term case studies of individual presidential campaigns.

In this case, I examine the candidacy of Ralph Nader in 2000 and 2004. His support dropped 83 percent in the span of just two elections. Voters for Nader fit into the greater narrative of third party voters. His supporters were unlikely to see differences between Gore and Bush in 2000 and expressed a level of frustration with government.

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Chapter 1: Introduction: Why Third Party Voters are Important

In America's history, no third party candidates have ever been elected president. Yet, many years, third party candidates vie for the position. These candidates get votes and support, however minimal. In a system that has only two dominant parties, these voters are an anomaly. Why take the time and effort to vote for a candidate almost destined to lose?

These voters might seem insignificant, but they are a fascinating group. Better understanding why they decide to vote for a third party candidate can help better our understanding of the electorate. We may be better able to predict which third party candidates will be successful. Perhaps third party presidential candidates may be able to attract more support by studying their voters.

While there is some research available about why voters decide to vote for third parties, many of these studies come to conflicting findings. There is debate over the importance of some of the personal and institutional factors, as I will show. These debates demonstrate the need for further research on the question of why voters decide to cast ballots for third parties.

Third parties play a role in the United States political system, though there is disagreement over how much influence they really have. Throughout United States history, third parties have had difficulty being elected. Schraufnagel (2011) explains, "No member of an organized third party has gained a seat in the United States Congress for over 50 years" (p. 1). Even in states, very few non-major parties are represented. "In 2008, a total of 20 out of a possible 7382 legislative seats in the 99 chambers of the 50 state legislatures were occupied by non-major party representatives" (Schraufnagel, 2011, p. 1). Despite the lack of third party candidates in office, third party candidates do get some degree of support, however minimal.

I argue third party voters in presidential elections tend to be more independent voters who have not committed to one political party. Younger voters are often supporters of third parties. Because they have not voted in as many elections as older voters, there is less of a pattern of votes for one particular party. Third party voters also tend to dislike government, in general. They are more likely to feel disenfranchised by the political process. The two main parties, they feel, do not accurately represent their views. They vote for third parties partly because they genuinely like the candidate and his views, and partly to cast a vote against the two main parties. These reasons for voting for third parties describe many, but not all, third party voters. These patterns are evident in both a long-term study of American presidential elections and short-term case studies of individual presidential campaigns.

As a preface to this analysis, I will define some of the terms used throughout this piece. I refer to third party candidates as candidates represented by an organized party (for example the Green Party or the Libertarian Party). I refer to non-major party candidates as encompassing both independents and third party candidates. When covering previous studies on third parties, I encountered two main categories of independent variables used to explain the dependent variable of voting for a third party. These independent variables fit into two categories: personal factors and institutional factors. Personal factors are data like political ideology, race, socioeconomic background, or education level. Institutional factors are variables like the constraints placed on candidates to get on a ballot (operationalized in something more concrete, such as number of signatures needed to be on a ballot), or whether or not candidates may be endorsed by more than one party. Because this is a study of why individuals decide to vote for a candidate, I focus most analysis on individual-level variables.

In this analysis of third party voters, I specifically focus on presidential elections. There is more work to be done about third parties and their voters in state and local elections. While it may be possible to develop a grand theory about all third party voters in America, I only focus on presidential elections. There is a vast supply of vetted, comprehensive, quality data to work with in presidential elections. In state elections, this data is nonexistent or impractical to use.

II. Institutional Factors

Research, on the whole, accepts that third parties influence campaigns. Major parties co-opt third party positions in order to gain a majority. Hirano and Snyder (2005) conclude that the reason third parties have had difficulty being elected after the New Deal is that the Democratic Party has incorporated more extreme left views into its platform. This has the effect of removing the purpose for having a third party. Hirano and Snyder believe that “we might expect that a third party electoral support could once again in prominence should the Democratic and Republican Parties once again fail to meet the policy demands of the political extremes” (p. 23). Thus, while individuals may not vote for a third party candidate, other candidates may adopt positions of the third party.

The electoral system favors having only two candidates, as Duverger (1972) notes and has established in Duverger’s Law. The law states that because the United States employs a system where candidates must receive a majority of votes, there is an incentive to co-opt extreme points of view into two candidates. In elections with more candidates, there is less likelihood that a candidate wins a majority. These institutional barriers to third parties are important because they serve to limit the options for voters. Voting for a third party becomes a highly irregular and odd occurrence within a system dominated by two main parties. This is part of why

understanding why voters make decisions to consciously abandon the two major parties is fascinating.

Third parties also face further challenges within the system. Schraufnagel finds that ballot access is restrictive; some states ban “fusion candidates” – candidates who represent multiple parties – but these factors are not as significant to the influence of Duverger’s Law (p. 25-47). Rosentstone et al. disagree, claiming that “when a nationally prestigious politician goes from being on three-quarters of the ballots to appearing on all of them, he enjoys a 75 percent boost in his vote” (p. 173). Rosenstone et al. are sure to separate the difference between a “prestigious candidate” and a “nationally prestigious candidate.” The nationally prestigious candidate is well-known and has national name recognition, often having run for national office under a major party affiliation (p. 140). Prestigious candidates tend to only focus on smaller geographic areas and represent a narrow set of viewpoints and have not “run for a national office on a major party ticket” (p. 140).

There is disagreement on whether or not institutional boundaries are significant in affecting voter choice. Third party candidates could be dissuaded from running, thus limiting voter choice. Even when third party candidates run, voters may not be inclined to vote for third parties. These constraints are important because they affect the choices voters make. If voters are only presented with Democratic and Republican Party candidates on a ballot, a logical conclusion is that third party candidates may not receive as much support. These institutional factors must be considered when running the analysis for my research. Control variables measuring the difficulty of ballot access are among some of the aspects which remain unsettled in previous research.

In states in which there are competitive elections, so-called “battleground states,” McClug and Holbrook (2009) find that partisanship increases. Because the outcome of these states matters so much, voters are more likely to identify as partisan. In these high-value states, the researchers do not determine if the chance for voting for a third party candidate decreases. However, in these states there is the chance that an individual’s vote is the pivotal factor in election success, so there is a greater chance that major parties will be favored.

III. Personal Factors

A study which has dealt directly with the issue of why voters choose non-major parties is by Reiter and Walsh (1995), where the elections of two governors and a senator are detailed. No link was found between a voter’s age, education, or income and vote choice for a non-major party candidate. However, political experience and how ideologically extreme a third party candidate was shown to matter. Yet, support is predictable – Liberal voters will support more Liberal non-major party candidates. Even partisans (for example, registered Democrats) are willing to back these non-major party candidates.

Reiter and Walsh do not come up with a larger scheme of testing who votes for non-major party candidates. Other variables, as I will discuss in the research design section, should be considered and tested. In my research I will try to come up with a larger theory, requiring that more candidates and different offices (governor, president, etc.) be incorporated into the analysis.

Others disagree on some of these personal factors which Reiter and Walsh tend to dismiss. Rosenstone et al. claim that those who have recently entered the electorate are more likely to support a third party: “The costs of defecting are lower since they have not yet settled into major party habits. In their first election, they are somewhat more vigilant and more

demanding. Hence their tolerance for major party failure is lower” (p. 216). If this is the case, younger individuals in the age 18-24 range would be expected to be more likely to vote for a third party. Age, as well as other personal factors, will be variables in our analysis to determine if a correlation exists.

The disagreement may also stem from a difference in the level of analysis. While Reiter and Walsh survey gubernatorial and senatorial races, Rosenstone et al. examine races only at the presidential level. Reiter and Walsh find no link between age and tendency to vote for a third party in gubernatorial elections in Connecticut in 1990. In a 1990 election in Vermont for U.S. Senate, independent candidate Bernie Sanders received a greater proportion of his votes from individuals aged 18-29. Whether or not age plays a role should be resolved in the research.

Political ideology also may be an important variable. Rosenstone et al. (1984) notice that during the early 1900s to 1920, socialist-leaning immigrants were more likely to cast minor party ballots: “As their proportion of the electorate rises 1 percent, third party support goes up .5 percent” (p. 175). This is a case which suggests ideologically extreme views were not incorporated by major parties, when viewed through the lens of Hirano and Snyder. Because these voters were unable to identify with the viewpoints of the candidates, they abandoned the major parties. How ideologically extreme an individual is is a variable to explore in my research. How much an individual feels they are represented or their concerns matter may also be an important variable to include.

Rosenstone et al. examine third parties throughout history. Their research shows that the success of third parties depends on the failure of the two major parties to represent voters’ interests. They find that in the 1890s, third parties were fairly popular because third parties represented an agricultural base. Farmers felt that the major parties were not actively

representing their needs. Rosenstone et al. also find that their generalization that dissatisfaction drives third party voting can be applied between 1952 to 1980 in presidential elections:

“Compared to citizens who evaluate the major party nominees favorably, those with the most critical assessments are 91 percent more likely to vote for an independent when a nationally prestigious candidate runs” (p. 169).

They argue that “third parties are expressions of negative sentiment. An examination of individual parties finds that third party backers are usually united, not in support, but rather in opposition to some person or issue” (p. 216). If this is the case, then why might some voters decide to vote for a third party while others decide not to vote? Party allegiance will be incorporated into the analysis as a personal factor.

Gold (2002) believes that anti-partisan sentiment is at work when considering two gubernatorial elections where third parties succeeded. Using Voter News Service exit poll questions, he found that those who have voted for a third party before and those who are independent were more likely to cast a vote for Jesse Ventura. Ventura garnered the most support from “youth, economic anxiety, opposition to gun control, as well as independence and a previous vote for Perot” (p. 278). He reasons that “the presence of a large bloc of independents (or voters with weak attachments to the established parties) is a precondition of third-party success” (p. 280).

Hillygus & Shields (2008) support the idea that those who are conflicted decide to “withdraw from politics all together,” especially when their social groups exert “cross-pressures” on their ideology (p. 29). They use survey data to measure what partisans think on a variety of issues ranging from gun control to school vouchers. They find that there are a “sizable number of partisan identifiers who disagree with the national party position of their preferred political

party” (p. 60). Yet, these individuals still tend to vote in favor of their party. At what point might a third party be an option for these individuals? They find that the most persuadable voters in the 2004 election were not cross-pressured independents (9 percent of the electorate) or pure independents conflicted in policy (9 percent of the electorate). In fact, cross-pressured partisans were most persuadable and receptive to another candidate’s viewpoints (27 percent of the electorate) (p. 69).

How devoted a voter is to a party is a variable that should be considered in this examination of why voters decide to vote for third parties. Perhaps registered independent voters will be more likely to vote for a non-major party when compared to registered Democrats or Republicans.

IV. The Candidates

Voters’ behavior may also be influenced by the range of third party candidates available. Luks et al. (2003) compare how voters viewed the three main candidates for the 1992 election between Clinton, Bush, and Perot; the 1996 election between Clinton, Dole, and Perot; and the 2000 election between Gore, Bush, and Buchanan.

Their findings suggest that voters’ perceptions about candidates influences vote choice. “Small effects due to the ratings of major party candidates have been decisive in determining election outcomes” (p. 28). While these traits may be based in “partisan and ideological orientations and retrospective economic judgments,” voter perceptions still have telling information (p. 28).

Moreover, voters view third parties as worse than major party candidates. The third party candidates are rated as “not too well” when voters were asked if the candidate “cares about

people like you” or “provides strong leadership” (p. 14). Luks et al. trace this attitude back to voters with a pre-existing ideology. “Partisans rated their party’s candidate substantially more favorably than members of the other major party, with the differences often amounting to greater than 25 percentage points” (p. 16).

Rosenstone et al. also stress the importance of ensuring that candidates are well known in presidential elections. They provide evidence that suggests that candidates who are nationally prestigious are more likely to receive votes than less well-known candidates.

V. Areas for Research

A survey of literature available on voter decision making and third party voters has suggested that there are many areas for exploration. Overall, researchers agreed that third parties have some degree of influence in elections. Most acknowledged that third party voting often happens as a result of disillusionment with the two major parties. Yet, not all agree if there is a typical third party voter. Some researchers pointed to younger voters as being more likely to vote for a third party, while others found that age was insignificant. Others believed that institutional factors were more powerful in shaping voting behavior. My research intends to examine multiple elections for president to determine which claims can be supported.

Chapter 2: Who is the third party voter?

In this section, I attempt to determine who votes for third parties in presidential elections. I looked at descriptive data about individuals who voted for third parties. I also considered the feelings and attitudes of respondents. This data used is from the cumulative data of surveys from

the National Election Studies. The data suggest that third party voters are not much different from voters who vote for Democrats and Republicans.

I expected to see younger voters as more likely to be third party voters because of fewer strong ties to parties. The data are consistent with the Rosenstone et al. (1984) claim that younger voters are more likely to vote for a third party. I also expected to see respondents who were dissatisfied with government and representatives. The data suggest this is true.

The few differences that exist between major party and third party voters are age – third party voters tend to be younger. They believe that the government is not representing their viewpoints or that the government and the way it relates to the public is a problem.

I. Research Design – Variables Used for Party of Presidential Vote

I use the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series cumulative data file in this analysis. The survey has been run since 1948, meaning that multiple election years will be taken into account. In all the instances when variables are compared in crosstabs, I used VCF0705 (Codebook, p. 615-6), which separates the party of a respondent's vote for president into either: Democrat, Republican, or Other. "Other" includes third party candidates, minor party candidates, and write-ins. This was re-coded to group votes for Democrats and Republicans together – meaning there were two valid voting options: Major parties or "other." I count these "other" votes and refer to them as third parties throughout the rest of the data analysis.

This variable was chosen over VCF0706, which is a more specific variable that separates the respondent's vote into: Democrat, Republican, a major third party candidate (Wallace in 1968, Anderson in 1980, and Perot in 1992 and 1996), other (a third or minor party candidate and write-ins), and did not vote for president or at all.

I chose VCF0705 because the “other category” encompasses both voters for “major third party candidates” and other third party candidates and write-ins. VCF0706 has a special category just for Anderson, Wallace, and Perot. This ignores other third party candidates and would make analyzing the data more difficult because there would be two responses which pertain to voting for a third party. Third party candidates like Ralph Nader, a focus in the next section, are part of the “other” category in VCF0706. Not including the wide variety of third party candidates would not benefit the analysis. Focusing on the more specific variable would only allow for an explanation of a select few candidates while ignoring others, which would potentially cause the analysis to not be as broadly applicable across all third party candidates.

There are potential weaknesses in choosing VCF0705 as the dependent variable. I interpret votes for “other” as votes for a third party. In reality, the votes for “other” are third and minor party candidates, including write-ins. Including write-ins could potentially affect the results of the data analysis. This was found to be acceptable because in some states, third party or minor party candidates do not receive enough support to appear on ballots. Thus, supporters must use write-ins to vote for a third party.

Throughout this section, I refer to both respondents – those who were asked questions in the National Election Study, and also voters – a more general term to describe the average major party or third party voter. I refer to voters as a broad generalization based on the more specific findings found from the respondents. They are used, at times, interchangeably.

II. Respondent Characteristics

I examined the basic characteristics of respondents in consideration of why they decide to vote for third parties. Respondents were no more or less likely to vote for a third party based on their gender, race, social standing, or most other personal features. Age was found to be a characteristic which matters. Younger voters are more likely to support a third party candidate. Each of these variables and descriptions are found below.


Gender

When gender is considered, it is not a factor in third party voting. Respondents who supported major parties were 45 percent male and 54 percent female. Third parties received support from approximately 55 percent males and 44 percent females. This was not deemed to be a significant difference between the major parties and third parties. There was no difference expected in gender, because third parties were not expected to appeal to a specific gender. Instead, third parties are expected to appeal to the voter who is dissatisfied with the job the two major parties are doing.

Age, Partisanship, and Occupation

Voters for third parties tend to be younger. This supports an expectation from previous studies conducted on third party voters (Rosenstone et al. 1984). The age groups between 17 to 54 years old were most prone to voting for third parties. The most voters for third parties were in the age 25 to 34 range (27 percent of votes for third parties were in this range – the highest in any single age range for both major party candidates and third party candidates). Major party candidates received the most support from the 35-44 range.

Also noteworthy is that older respondents support major parties at rates far higher than third parties. While those 75 and older accounted for 6.2 percent of the sample, only 3.5 percent of respondents in the 75 and older age group supported a third party. Age is a factor that could affect an individual's likelihood of voting for a third party.



Difference was significant ($X^2=61.297$, $p<.0001$)

There are several possible explanations for this difference observed in age. When respondents were asked if parties are only interested in getting votes, there was a fairly consistent number of people in each age group who agreed and disagreed. Around 55 percent of voters in each age group agree that parties are only interested in votes. Older respondents, those 65 and older agreed that parties are only interested in votes around 64 percent of the time. Although young voters are more likely to vote for a third party, there were no more negative perceptions


about major parties than in other age groups. Partisanship tends to strengthen in age, possibly because older individuals have voted many more times and typically commit or identify with one of the major parties.

Respondents' age did not measurably affect whether or not they thought there was "no difference" when asked if there were any important difference between major parties.

Part of the explanation for why younger respondents voted for third parties could be in the strength of their partisanship. Fewer respondents said they were "independent or apolitical" as they were older. In the 17-24 age range, 19.2 percent labeled themselves independent or apolitical. This decreases to 14.4 percent of respondents in the 25-34 range.

There is also a large amount of people who label themselves as "leaning independent" for younger voters. Among respondents aged 17-24, 28.9 percent labeled themselves this way. For 25-to-34-year-olds, 25 percent said this. The number decreases with age. One possible explanation for the reason why age matters is because of the high amount of people who classify themselves as independent or leaning independent.

Rosenstone et al. (1984) believe that part of the reason third parties get support is from ideologically extreme individuals who have not found their views represented in the two main parties. This was not confirmed in the data. Those who are independents or leaning independents are more likely to vote for a third party. Those who are strong partisans are likely to vote for a major party.



Difference was significant ($X^2=426.814$, $p<.0001$)

Partisanship is a key factor. Age is only a way that partisanship is expressed; it is not the underlying factor driving third party support. Partisanship is also manifested in an individual's occupation. Students tend to support third parties at a much greater rate than other occupations support third parties. Of students, 8.4 percent supported a third party candidate while 91.6 percent supported a major party. In categories like employed, unemployed, retired, or a homemaker, third parties only receive around 4 percent support. It is plausible that because students tend to be younger and less partisan, they are more likely to support a third party.

Age was found to be a factor that separates third party voters from major party voters. Rosenstone et al. (1984) raise the idea that third party voters are likely to be younger because

they have yet to commit to one of the two main parties. The data support this generalization. Older voters are less independent and are more committed to one of the two main parties.

Race

While age plays a role in third party voting, race was not found to be related to whether or not a third party received more votes. More white voters support third parties (91.6 percent of respondents voting for a third party were white, 2.9 percent were black, while 5.4 percent were “other”). There is a nearly 8 percent difference in support from black voters, who comprise 10.6 percent of respondents voting for a major party. This difference, while slight, is possibly due to the strong allegiance black voters have to the Democratic Party (91.5 percent of black respondents voted for the Democratic Party).

Geography

The geographic census region of a respondent was also unrelated to support for third parties. Respondents from the Northeast, North Central, South, and West tended to support third parties at similar rates.

Income

Family income also was not found to be a factor in affecting vote choice. Family incomes in all percentiles tended to support third parties at no statistically significant different rates than major parties.

Education

Education did not tend to affect vote choice, either. In general, there was a trend for more voters for third parties to be educated – they received the most support from those with some college or college and advanced degrees. Among respondents who had 8 grades or less of school, votes were cast for third parties only 2.2 percent of the time. This increased to 5.5 percent for those with some college and leveled at 5 percent for those with BA level and advanced degrees.

Religion

Religion was not a factor which was statistically significant, either. A fairly even amount of support was given from mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, Jews, non-traditional orthodox, non-Christian and non-Jewish, and “atheist, agnostic, and none.”

Interest in Public Affairs

Voters for major parties and third parties are also equally interested in public affairs, with hardly any difference in all levels of interest. The highest number of respondents said they followed public affairs “some of the time” or “fairly closely” (40.4 percent of major party voters said this, with 39.6 percent of third party voters in agreement). Those who do not vote are more likely to not find interest in public affairs. 27.4 percent of respondents who did not vote said they were “hardly at all” interested in public affairs, while only 8.5 percent of those who did vote said this.

III. Respondent Beliefs and Attitudes

Respondents who have a generally negative view towards government, the major parties, and how government relates to the people are more likely to vote for a third party. The dissatisfaction in these areas separates third party voters from major party voters. Whereas major party voters have a generally neutral view on how the government operates, third party voters have a more negative outlook. Evidence comparing partisanship with variables measuring dissatisfaction suggests that partisanship is not the underlying variable. Instead, dissatisfaction is a variable on its own.


When the attitudes of respondents are considered, there is strong evidence of a dislike for the major parties. When asked to rate the major parties on a thermometer (with 0 degrees representing cold or disliking the party, 50 degrees representing a mild – neither liking nor disliking –, and 100 degrees representing hot or a strong liking of the major parties), there was a great deal of variation between third party voters and major party voters. Among third party voters, 29.4 percent would rate the major parties below 50 degrees, 27.8 percent rate the parties at 50 degrees, and 42.7 percent rated the major parties above 50 degrees. Third party voters feel, overall, warmly to the major parties.


Yet, among major party voters, there is a more intense warm feeling towards major parties. Among them, 20.8 percent would rate the major parties below 50 degrees, 21 percent rate the parties at 50 degrees, and 58 percent rated the major parties above 50 degrees.

There is a nearly 15 percent difference among third parties and major parties in the above 50 degrees ratings. This suggests that major party voters view Democrats and Republicans more warmly than third party voters do.

Third party voters do not have as strong a voter preference, however. Though these voters would be expected to have a strong desire to elect a candidate from one of the third parties, this was not the case. Respondents were asked, “Would you say that your preference for this candidate was strong or not strong?” (p. 1018 *Codebook*). Major party voters feel strongly about their presidential vote 76.7 percent of the time, while they felt not strong 23.3 percent of the time. Third parties feel strongly 69.3 percent of the time and not strongly 30.7 percent of the time.


A potential explanation for this behavior could be that third party voters want to vote, but simply want another choice which the major parties have not offered. Another explanation could be that major party voters have an intense dislike for the other candidate; therefore, they strongly feel that their own party candidate is a good choice. Respondents who voted for a third party appear to not be voters who feel strongly about their candidate, but the political system, overall. A pattern of attitudes which express frustration with the government, as an institution, is evident in the data.





Third party voters are less likely to see a difference between the two major parties than voters for the two major parties on a statistically significant basis. 30.6 percent of major party voters said there was no difference between the two parties. 42.7 percent of third party voters said there was no difference between the two parties. This adds to the idea that third party voters may want more options than the two major parties. Because the major parties are too similar to the respondents, they seek another option.

Respondents were asked whether or not the federal government is run by few interests or for the benefit of all; third party voters were more likely to think the government is run for a few big interests. 78.3 percent of third party voters said the government was run for a few big interests, while 58.7 percent of major party voters agreed. Though both types of voters seem to believe in this idea, third party voters are far more accepting of the idea by a rate of nearly 20 percentage points.



Difference was significant ($X^2=274.836$, $p<.0001$)

The same general dislike of government is a pattern that continues to be shown when voters were asked how many government officials are “crooked.” 37.3 percent of major party voters thought there were “quite a few” or “quite a lot” of government officials who were crooked. Another 48.3 percent of major party voters thought “not many” officials are crooked, and 12.2 percent thought there were “hardly any” who were crooked.

50.7 percent of third party voters thought there were “quite a few” or “quite a lot” of government officials who were crooked. Another 41.1 percent of third party voters thought “not many” officials are crooked, and 7 percent thought there were “hardly any” who were crooked. The data suggest that third party voters are more likely to think the government is not being run by the correct government officials. When the question of crookedness is compared to

partisanship, there is no significant difference in beliefs. From independents, to weak partisans, to strong partisans, the same percentage of respondents share similar beliefs.

Third party voters are also unlikely to think their representatives care what they think. 57.3 percent of third party voters believe government officials “don’t care much” what people like them think. Only 40.6 percent of major party voters think government officials don’t care much what people like them think. Third party voters feel that the two major parties have not been responsive enough and are not accurately representing or listening to their viewpoints. The sense of government being unrepresentative supports the idea from Rosenstone et al. (1984) that the success of third parties depends on the failure of the major parties to represent interests.

This pattern continues when respondents were asked whether or not parties make government pay attention to the people. Third party voters were less likely to think that parties make government responsive on a statistically significant basis. Third party voters also are less trusting of the general government to do what is right. Among major party voters, 54.1 percent thought that government can never be trusted or can be trusted only “some of the time.” Among third party voters, 73.8 percent thought that government can never be trusted or can only be trusted only “some of the time.”

Third party voters are not more conservative or libertarian, either, suggesting that the distrust of government is not because of underlying views. While most are independent or apolitical, there is a nearly equal amount of those who initially classified themselves as Democrats or Republicans.

V. Institutional Factors

While I introduce the concept of institutional factors like Duverger's Law, I hold these institutional factors as constant throughout. The electoral system favors the creation of two major parties throughout the nation's history. It does not change in a major way throughout. Because the system stays generally the same, I do not run any particular analysis on the system itself.

Discussion of Results

By looking at the different descriptive characteristics of third party voters, I found that there is little difference that separates third party voters from major party voters based on basic demographics. There was not an expectation to find any differences, simply because third parties are not consistent enough to attract a particular demographic. Race, gender, religion, and geographic background were not expected to be key factors, and the data support this expectation. Age was shown to be a factor that matters. The data suggest that the findings by Rosenstone et al. (1984) are supported – younger voters will vote for third parties because they have not yet committed to a major party, whereas older voters will continue to vote for a party they have supported.

I also found evidence that people with dissatisfaction with the two major parties and government, as a whole, tend to vote for third parties. Respondents who feel abandoned by the major parties are more likely to vote for a third party.

Conclusion and Further Research

Because of the small sample size of third party voters, data was only analyzed when there were a high number of cases (600 or more). Unfortunately, some questions which have relevance

to this analysis could not be included because of the small sample size (usually 100-300).

Asking respondents to react to statements like “Is voting the only way to have a say in government?” or “It doesn’t matter if I vote or not” or “Are things in the U.S. going well or not?” or “Do you favor or oppose term limits?” could have further developed our understanding of who third party voters are. These are issues that are related to a difficulty finding third party voters, a small proportion of the electorate.

The findings from this data analysis support some viewpoints already existing in available literature, while also challenging others. In the next section, I perform a case study of voters for Ralph Nader in 2000 and 2004. While this overall view of third party voters is helpful to understanding why voters decide to vote for third parties, a case study will help add to the knowledge gained from this analysis.

Section II: Ralph Nader – the 2000 and 2004 Elections

In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, political observers and ordinary citizens were looking deeper into the way votes were counted. George W. Bush and Al Gore were in an extremely close race. Among some of the conclusions from the race was that Ralph Nader, the Green Party candidate, “stole” the election from Al Gore. Nader received 2.74 percent of the national popular vote and 1.63 percent of the vote in Florida. Nader’s voters were criticized for allowing Bush to win Florida, and therefore the entire election. Hillygus (2007) notes that Nader voters were told by Democrats that a “vote for Nader is a vote for Bush” (p. 236). In 2004, Nader tried to run again, much less successfully. He received a mere .38 percent in the national election and just .43 percent of the vote in Florida. In four years, Nader’s support dropped off.

In this section, I will present a case study of Ralph Nader's candidacy. Nader ran for president in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008. For the purposes of this analysis, we will examine 2000, a year in which he attracted many voters, and 2004, a year in which he lost support. He is one of a handful of third party candidates who have made multiple attempts at the presidency. This is interesting and useful because his support can be tracked over multiple years. This way, shifts in the kinds of voters he attracts can be analyzed. A better vision of third party voters can emerge. Past research on third party candidates has already focused on candidates like Ross Perot or Patrick Buchanan. Not as much research has been done on Nader and nothing was found to have traced the course of multiple elections.

I hypothesize that Nader voters attempted to make a statement of dislike for both major candidates in the 2000 election. This would be consistent with the theory in the previous section. The dislike of "business as usual" drives third party support. Nader voters decided to vote as a way to signal their disapproval. Four years later, when Bush ran against Democrat John Kerry, supporters for Nader shifted to support Kerry (Roig-Franzia & Finer, 2004). Their dislike for Bush was stronger than their like for Kerry. Yet, there were still Nader voters in 2004 to be accounted for. These voters represent more of the "typical third party voter" we might expect from analyzing the ANES data in the previous section. These were younger, independent voters. One possible explanation is that the electorate no longer favorably viewed Nader, possibly, in part, because of how he affected the 2000 elections.

Hillygus (2007) finds that Nader voters in 2000 were strategic in the way they supported him. Closer to Election Day, individuals would change their vote to support Gore. Voters in "safe states," or states projected to be easily won for Gore or Bush, were less likely to abandon their support for Nader (p. 237). Nader supporters were also more likely to express they were

voting against another candidate, rather than genuinely liking the candidate (p. 240). “Those supporting Nader for expressive reasons were undeterred by the wasted vote appeal, and were the most likely to remain loyal. These voters might not be voting so as to alter the outcome but instead to send a message or signal” (p. 242).

The research in the previous section is compatible with Hillygus’ conclusions. The ANES data only considers a voter’s final decision and their final vote. It does not study voters over the course of an entire election; therefore, it is difficult to confirm the theory of strategic voting, because information on an individual voter is needed to reach this conclusion. The idea of sending a “message or signal” is still consistent with the analysis of ANES data.

“It appears to be more effective for minor-party candidates to campaign against the other candidates and against the political system than to run on the basis of their own platform and policy positions” (p. 242).

Gallup, Inc., which runs polls surveying voters during presidential elections, follows a similar narrative to Hillygus (2007). “Third party candidates’ support typically drops as the campaign approaches election day, perhaps because voters realize the candidates have little chance to win. Second, generally speaking, support for third-party candidates tends to be higher in the broader pool of registered voters than in the smaller group of actual voters.”

Research Design:

This section uses the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) to analyze Nader’s candidacy. This dataset was used because it includes a larger sample size of Nader voters, particularly in 2000, so I will be better able to study what caused voters to support him.

The Typical Nader Voter in 2000:

By ideology, the typical Nader voter is similar to the typical Gore voter. The percentage of respondents who rated themselves on a spectrum from conservative to liberal is nearly identical. Nader attracted slightly more very liberal individuals. Gore and Nader received nearly the same percentage of moderate voters – the ideology that is typically more supportive of third party candidates.

Percentage of Support for Each Candidate by Self-Rated Ideology Scale
2000 Election (Pre-Election Interview)

		on ballot for president		
		sh	re	er
r liberal	vative	0.13	0.02	0.01
	3	0.50	0.14	0.17
		0.31	0.47	0.42
		0.05	0.31	0.26
		0.01	0.06	0.15
sponses (n=)		2581	2189	176


Difference was significant ($X^2=1694.772$, $p<.0001$)

While the two candidates tried to win over similar ideologies, the Nader voters were also dissatisfied with the options presented to them. Nader voters were more likely to say they did not see differences between Republicans and Democrats. While 16.7 percent of Bush voters and 20.3

percent of Gore voters said there was no difference between the two parties, 39.8 percent of Nader voters said there was no difference. This is consistent with the vision of third party voters that emerged in the previous chapter. This may be part of the reason why Nader voters decided to support him rather than Gore.


Some Nader *supporters* (i.e. those who did not end up voting for Nader) eventually decided to vote for Gore, as Hillygus (2007) notes. The crosstabs only examine what the voters for the particular candidate said. There is no way to measure the responses of supporters who changed from Nader to Gore. Those who switched may have been able to see enough of a difference between the two parties to support Gore. They may have voted for Gore because the prospect of a Bush presidency was unappealing. These potential explanations cannot be supported by the data but are offered only as possibilities.

While the NAES and ANES do not question respondents about who they initially prefer for president and compare whether or not they actually vote for the candidate, there are other polls that were conducted. ABC News found Nader voters were likely to defect to Gore: “44 percent say they are definitely for him, but a majority, 56 percent, say they may change their minds. And a majority of those potential defectors — more than six in 10 — say there’s a good chance they’ll switch. Gore would figure to benefit from defections among Nader’s supporters. If Nader were not running, 56 percent of his supporters say they would vote for Gore, while just 23 percent would cast their ballots for Bush, the poll says. An additional 21 percent say they would not vote at all” (ABC News, 2000).



Difference was significant ($X^2=301.171$, $p<.0001$)


When each candidate's voters were asked if they cared who wins, Nader voters were far less likely to respond that they cared a "good deal" about who wins.



Difference was not significant ($X^2=27.407$, $p=0.1578$)

Nader voters in 2000 were more likely to state that they vote because of duty – at a rate higher than Bush or Gore voters. This difference was not determined to be statistically significant because only 54 respondents voted for Nader. However, the data suggest that more Nader voters viewed their vote not as a way to get satisfaction. They may not have genuinely liked Nader, but voted for him as a sense that it was their responsibility to make their dissatisfaction expressed.

Other individual-level variables that I explored in the previous section generally describe the typical Nader voter. By gender, voters for Nader were split nearly evenly at 50 percent. Race was not a significant variable. Household income was not a defining characteristic. Most Nader respondents were in the 18-34 age range, but 22 percent of his support was from 45-54 year-olds. This age structure is slightly older than the “typical” third party voter.



Geography was significant only in one particular instance – the South Atlantic Census region. Whereas Bush and Gore respondents were from the South Atlantic 19 percent of the time, Nader voters were from the South Atlantic 9 percent of the time. This may be due to the

closeness of the race in Florida affecting decision-making. This is an instance of institutional factors influencing an individual's decision. Because a race is close, potential third party voters may realize that the third party candidate has no chance at winning. They may consider their vote to be more meaningful and decisive if they vote for one of the two major parties.

These institutional factors – the closeness of the race – had some effect on the outcome.

The Typical Nader Voter in 2004:

In 2004, the typical Nader voter was more like a typical third party voter. Nader voters were predominantly self-described independents (19 of 33 Nader voters were independent). Among the 33 respondents, there were a mix of ages, racial backgrounds, education levels, and geographic locations. These were consistent with the previous description of third party voters. The smaller sample size makes conclusions more difficult to reach.

2000 and 2004: The Differences


Ideally, I want to know whether or not Nader's past influence in the 2000 election affected voters' decisions in 2004. While there are no direct questions on whether or not the 2000 election weighed on the minds of voters, I use favorability ratings and interpret their significance.

Directly after the 2000 elections, Ralph Nader's favorability declined among major party voters. It suggests he was viewed negatively or as an "election spoiler." Before the election, individuals surveyed (regardless of ideological standpoint) rated him nearly evenly favorably and unfavorably. After the election, there was a stark difference in the percentage of people who viewed him positively. Only 17.3 percent viewed him favorably (above a 5) in 2004. This was a


strong decline from the 29.7 percent who viewed him favorably before the 2000 election. There are several possible explanations for this decline. First, re-interviews were conducted from November 11, 2000 through December 7, 2000. During this time, there was still uncertainty as to whether Bush or Gore had won the state of Florida (CNN, 2000). Without knowing how close the race was in Florida, voters had not yet been exposed to the full impact of Gore's loss and had yet to blame Nader for taking votes away from Gore. Once voters had seen the impact, it poisoned the voting pool. People were less likely to want to support Nader – not only for affecting Gore's results, but also because Bush and Kerry were far different.

When I examine Nader's favorability while simultaneously taking into account the respondents' final vote choice, I find that Gore voters are the ones who change their opinions the most after the 2000 election. Before the election, eventual Gore voters rated Nader positively (above 50) 45.5 percent of the time. After the election only 31 percent of Gore voters rated Nader positively. Gore voters were more likely after the election to rate Nader negatively. These results suggest Gore voters, and Democratic voters, in general, felt Nader to be unfavorable after Gore's loss. This suggests that institutional constraints – the way Nader took away votes from Gore – were a factor in Gore voters' dislike of Nader.

Nader Favorability, Pre-Election 2000, By Final Vote Choice




Nader Favorability, Post-Election 2000, By Final Vote Choice



Pre: Bush n=1538, Gore n=1269, Nader n=119

Post: Bush n=2388, Gore n=2029, Nader n=178



In 2004, Annenberg changed the favorability ratings system to a 0 to 100 point scale (0 being strongly disliked and 100 being strongly liked). To measure the difference, I treated 0 to 1 as equivalent to 0 to 10 on the 100 point scale, 2 as equivalent to 11 to 20 on the 100 point scale, and so on.

When Nader tried to run in 2004, his appeal was lost on potential supporters. Both Bush and Kerry voters tended to negatively rate Nader (below 5 on the 0 to 10 point scale). This can be explained by Bush and Kerry being different enough options for voters. Or, Nader's 2000 effect on the race affected voters' decisions. There is not enough evidence from questions to support either explanation. Respondents were not asked how similar the two parties were in 2004, so there is no way to compare the two years.

There was no evaluation of Nader's favorability in the interviews conducted directly after the 2004 election. Because Nader received far less support and was less of a factor in influencing the election, I would expect his favorability ratings would not decrease dramatically for Bush and Kerry voters.

Conclusion: Lessons from Nader's Candidacy

Some of the most interesting voters in this campaign are the ones who switched support from Nader to voting for Gore. Unfortunately, there is no way to track these voters' beliefs. This would allow us to understand why some who contemplated voting for a third party decided to vote for a major party. Nonetheless, Nader's candidacy in 2000 and 2004 reveals that third party voters remain consistent throughout time. His drop in support in four years could have been for multiple reasons. Even after his run in 2004, he ran again in 2008 under the premise that Obama and McCain were too similar.

Overall Conclusion

Third party voters are individuals dissatisfied with the options the two major parties have presented. For third party candidates to be successful, several conditions need to be present. First, the third party candidate for president should appeal to moderates. As was the case in the Nader election and throughout the ANES data, moderates or independents are the primary supporters of third parties. However, Gore attracted a similar crowd of voters in 2000. So while moderates vote for third parties more often, it is not an absolutely necessary characteristic.

Moderates are more likely to feel that the major party candidate offerings are inadequate. The failure of the two major parties is critical for the success of a third party candidate. Evidence

indicates Nader was not a candidate who voters genuinely liked or identified with his policies. Instead, he was an option outside one of the main parties. These votes capture dissatisfaction.

In recent elections, candidates use this dissatisfaction element in rhetoric. In 2000, Nader said, "Our two parties are basically one corporate party wearing two heads and different makeup. There is a difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, but not that much" (CBS News, 2009). In 2012, Virgil Goode ran as a member of the Constitution Party. In a radio interview, he said, "People will wake up and see there's not much difference between Romney and Obama" (Deace, 2012). These statements demonstrate that third party candidates know that they will attract voters who believe no difference exists between the parties. Making these kinds of statements is a strategic plan.

Throughout, young voters are a common supporter of third parties. Young voters will continue to support third parties because of their recent entry into politics. They are more likely to be moderates. They are more likely to be dissatisfied with the options before them. As they age, they become content with voting for the "lesser of two evils." Age is not the determining factor, though. The underlying factor is whether or not an individual self-describes as a moderate.

With more available data, third parties on a local or state level could be studied in a comprehensive way. This information would be useful to analyze future races and predict outcomes and likelihood of third party candidate success. There are plenty of other variables that are not to be operationalized or measured, either. For instance, if third party presidential candidates were able to debate the major party candidates, their support would increase. If ballot access for third parties was less restrictive, we might observe greater competitiveness from third

parties. These hypotheticals all deal with the institutional factors I discussed earlier. These are factors that are not easily distilled into a variable.

While there is still work to be done on researching third party candidates and voters, this analysis builds on the existing knowledge. We better know the kinds of supporters third parties attract. There have been 44 presidents, with none being from third parties. Perhaps, in the future, America may elect a third party president, but it will take an exceptional candidate.

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Summary of Capstone Project

Introduction and Findings

When Americans vote, they oftentimes accept that they must choose between a Democratic or Republican candidate for president. This two-party phenomenon is somewhat unique to American democracy. Holland, for instance, has 11 parties which are represented in the House and Senate. Why would America not have more parties? America is made up of many different viewpoints and perspectives. We are diverse country, yet are only represented by two main parties.

The political system is skewed to favor two parties, as I discuss later in this Capstone Summary. Even though third party candidates run for president, time and time again, these candidates run small campaigns and receive little media attention compared to Democrats or Republicans. Not only do third party candidates run against the odds, but some people vote for third parties.

Many might think these voters are naïve – they believe that their candidate will win. Others might think that these voters are trying to make a statement. There are some theories available about why people decide to vote for third parties. Some of these studies disagree with each other.

I want to find out why people decide to vote for third parties. Voting for one is an odd occurrence; there are so few people who vote for one. It hardly makes sense for a third party to run, let alone voters to support one.

Through my analysis, I discover that third party voters are dissatisfied with the two major parties' offerings. They are not far different from voters from Republican or Democratic voters. Indeed, they may vote for Democrats or Republicans regularly but be dissatisfied in one election.

Younger voters are more likely to vote for third parties, too. This is partly because they have less of a tolerance for imperfection from major parties' candidates.

Methodology

The purpose of this Capstone Summary is to better explain some of the terms used, the concepts behind the analysis, and the process involved in analyzing the data. While the thesis keeps terms simple and targeted towards a general, educated audience, this summary provides additional explanation.

In this thesis, I attempt to answer the question of why people vote for third parties in two ways. First, I look at study data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) to get a sense of the typical third party over time. The ANES surveys voters from 1948 to present day. This enables me to get a general picture of a third party voter and make some judgments about why they vote for third parties.

I also perform a case study of Ralph Nader's candidacy in 2000 and 2004. Nader was selected because he is a recent candidate who has not been analyzed over multiple elections. I not only want to get a broad sense of a third party voter, but also examine a specific candidate. To do this, I rely on the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), a dataset which asks voters a series of questions in election years. The dataset spans 2000, 2004, and 2008. In general, there is a large sample of third party voters in this dataset.

There are problems with both the ANES and NAES data, though. First, it is difficult to find third party voters. They are so rare that while there may be thousands of Democratic and Republican voters we can analyze, there are only hundreds of voters we can analyze for third parties. In many presidential elections, third parties only capture a fraction of one percent of the

vote. This makes reaching conclusions difficult because the sample size is very small. This is part of the reason why this analysis focuses on voters in presidential races. Third parties run at all levels of government, but data on state and local levels is far more limited. There are fewer comprehensive datasets available.

In both datasets, there is no clear cut question which asks “Why are you voting for a third party?” Instead, answers to questions like, “What is your age?” or “How satisfied are you with the two major parties?” are used to reach conclusions. Interpretation of these questions always includes some subjectivity and room for debate. When personal factors like age, gender, or race are brought up, there is little subjectivity involved in the data interpretation. However, when respondents are asked more opinion-driven questions, more subjectivity is involved.

The answers to ANES and NAES survey questions are then run through *cross tabulations*, which show exactly how many respondents answered the question and how they answered. The results from these crosstabs are presented in a simple graphic format within the thesis.

Explanation of Terms and Theories

One of the major theories about why we have uncompetitive third parties is from Duverger’s Law. The law explains that in countries where a candidate must win a *majority* of votes, there will naturally be two parties which form. So, rather than just win the most percentage of votes, in the United States, the winner must win at least 50 percent. This incentivizes two parties to form. The two parties will not have extraordinary ideologies. Instead, they will be more moderate.

For example, the Republican Party has absorbed viewpoints from the Tea Party into its platform. The Tea Party is a party devoted to lower taxation and smaller government. Another recent example is the Democratic Party absorbing viewpoints from the Occupy Wall Street movement, a group which believes wealthy individuals should pay more taxes. Rather than just let these groups run third party candidates, the two major parties tried to accommodate these fringes.

Other democracies have another system called *proportional representation*. This is a system whereby the number of representatives a party sends to the legislature is determined by the percent of the vote. For instance, in a 100 member legislative body where the Socialist party gets 10 percent of the vote, 10 members from the Socialist party will be elected.

Because viewpoints are absorbed by two parties and there is an incentive for two parties to form, it makes third party candidates a rarity. It makes voting for a third party a rarity.

When we look at the likelihood of a person voting, we often examine factors of how close the election is, how much the voter feels his/her vote will count, and what benefits or costs the voter will incur. Generally, it makes little sense in voting for a candidate who cannot win. The cost of voting – the time and effort required – is too great. This is why third party voters are so interesting.

Significance

This project seeks to clarify our understanding of third party voters. Much past scholarly work only examines one candidate or a handful, while this relies on a wide range of data and also presents a case study. More data on third party voters is always helpful, so further data could better our understanding.